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Great	easing?	Leaders	face	a	tragic	dilemma,	but	they
should	not	hide	behind	the	backs	of	experts
Political	leaders	everywhere	face	stark	choices	that	will	define	the	social	and	economic	future	of	their	countries.
They	must	decide	if	and	how	to	wind-down	the	societal	lockdowns	that	we	have	witnessed	across	the	world.	They
do	so	against	a	background	of	widespread	anxieties.	Economic	collapse	awaits	should	there	not	be	a	rapid
resumption	of	economic	life.	But	a	relaxation	of	‘lockdown’	measures	can	have	dire	consequences:	a	‘second	wave’
might	stretch	state	capacities	even	further	than	we	have	witnessed	thus	far.	This	is	truly	a	tragic	dilemma,
argue	Arjen	Boin	(University	of	Leiden)	and	Martin	Lodge	(LSE).
Debates	about	how	to	juggle	competing	values	(economy,	public	health,	and	such)	are,	of	course,	common	in
public	management.	But	the	current	uncertainty	in	which	policymakers	have	to	make	these	decisions	is	deeply
unsettling.	In	a	recent	press	conference,	the	Dutch	prime	minister	started	by	explaining	how	he	has	wrestled	with
this	dilemma.	Earlier	he	had	observed	how	big	decisions	must	be	made	with	little	information.	It	is	the	textbook
description	of	a	crisis.
Politicians	more	or	less	everywhere	have	sought	refuge	in	the	domain	of	experts	and	science	to	reach	a	verdict.
Scientists	must	provide	the	desired	certainty	about	this	or	that	policy	option:	if	we	open	the	restaurants,	will	the	R0
rise	(a	measure	few	politicians,	let	alone	the	wider	public,	had	heard	about	a	few	months	ago)?	By	how	much?	If	we
keep	restaurants	and	pubs	locked	down,	how	many	venues	will	survive?	Politicians	are	now	discovering	the	truth
long	understood	in	this	domain:	the	available	science	does	not	provide	answers	to	these	sorts	of	questions.	A	quick
survey	of	scientific	articles	–	there	are	not	many	to	read	–	on	the	management	of	pandemics	leads	to	a	sobering
conclusion:	the	available	science	does	not	allow	for	‘evidence-based	prescriptions’	for	the	exit	strategy	from	a
global	pandemic.	Much	of	what	we	know	is	reportedly	‘anecdotal’	and	based	on	historical	studies	of	the	1918
pandemic.
This	rude	awakening	has	not	stopped	politicians	from	pushing	experts	onto	the	public	stage.	They	are	asked	to
advise	on	anything	from	office	space	to	public	transport,	from	whether	professional	football	players	can	resume
training	again,	to	the	dangers	of	a	walk	in	the	park.	Some	experts	may	relish	their	newfound	fame,	others	may
understand	the	reputational	risks	on	the	horizon.	They	would	probably	all	agree	that	these	are	political	decisions
that	will	have	to	be	made	in	a	cloud	of	uncertainty.
To	make	these	decisions	is	the	essence	of	crisis	leadership.	Political	leaders	will	have	to	step	up	to	the	plate,
sooner	or	later.	But	how	to	deal	with	this	uncertainty,	if	experts	and	scientists	cannot	(and	should	not)	offer	clear-cut
answers?
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In	dealing	with	deep	uncertainty,	politicians	can	choose	between	two	approaches	when	considering	the	‘great
easing’:	the	principled	or	the	pragmatist	route.	The	pragmatist	approach	would	follow	a	basic	incremental	pattern,
relying	on	feedback	to	either	further	relax	or	reassert	economic	and	societal	controls.	The	principled	approach
selects	one	dominant	principle	and	designs	an	approach	based	on	that	principle.
In	many	countries,	a	pragmatic	strategy	seems	to	be	in	the	offing:	plans	are	being	put	forward	for	a	step-by-step
relaxation	that	will	require	constant	reevaluation.	The	traditional	literature	on	risk	management	would	find	much	to
say	in	defence	of	the	pragmatic	approach:	if	done	well,	such	a	sequential	and	information-rich	approach	can	enable
the	gradual	opening	of	economic	and	social	life	(and	might	give	reassurance	to	frightened	populations)	while
minimising	the	costs	in	terms	of	surplus	fatalities	and	health	system	overstretch.	At	the	same	time,	it	presumes	the
presence	and	sustainability	of	an	administrative	infrastructure	that	‘tests,	traces,	and	isolates.’	In	short,	the
pragmatist	approach	is	a	cautious,	low-risk	approach	that	maximises	control	while	negotiating	uncertainty.
But	it	is	not	an	easy	road.	The	world	of	crisis	management	points	to	the	high	demands	that	a	pragmatic	approach
places	on	decision-makers.	It	presupposes	that	‘error’	can	be	corrected	without	too	high	a	cost.	It	requires
agreement	on	the	indicators	that	might	help	to	make	sense	of	the	evolving	situation,	good	information	flows	that
inform	such	indicators,	and	a	capacity	to	maintain	stable	conditions	in	order	to	ensure	such	a	gradual	evaluation-
based	approach.	Most	of	all	it	requires	a	capacity	not	just	to	‘relax’	or	restore	‘full	lockdown’,	but	also	to	maintain
and	enforce	partial	‘lock-down’	in	the	face	of	inevitable	calls	for	more	(and	less)	relaxation.
A	pragmatist	approach	is	prone	to	many	vulnerabilities.	For	one,	choices	as	to	what	to	‘re-open’	and	which	areas	to
keep	‘closed’	will	inevitably	invite	lobbying	efforts	and	clamouring	for	privileged	re-starts.	Any	form	of	uneven
application	(across	sectors	and	countries),	even	if	justified	by	‘consistent’	risk	management	principles,	will	attract
vocal	opposition.	Inconsistencies	in	approach	will	attract	ridicule,	condemnation	by	Courts,	or	provoke	outrage,
which	undermines	trust	in	the	measures	taken	(for	example,	by	letting	tattoo	parlours	trade	whilst	other	businesses
remain	in	enforced	shutdown).	While	these	apparent	inconsistencies	may	well	be	defensible	in	a	pragmatic
approach,	it	will	require	superior	crisis	communication	to	‘sell’	the	trial-by-error	search	for	the	exit.
The	principled	approach	also	comes	with	distinct	benefits	and	risks.	This	approach	is	on	display	in	two	distinct
flavours.	We	see	exit	approaches	that	centre	around	the	precautionary	principle	(one	example	being	the
Netherlands),	which	dictates	that	a	relaxation	of	a	measure	can	only	happen	if	there	is	conclusive	evidence	that	it
will	not	cause	a	return	of	heightened	infection	and	death	numbers.	Being	a	’second’	if	not	’third’	mover	behind	other
jurisdictions	may,	therefore,	make	political	sense,	giving	reassurance	to	societal	and	economic	actors	that	they	are
unlikely	to	encounter	a	further	period	of	severe	lock-down.	However,	such	a	strategy	will	be	attacked	for	being
overly	cautious	and	harmful,	especially	if	other	countries	are	seen	to	be	moving	ahead	without	detriment	to	public
health.	It	also	requires	agreement	as	to	what	qualifies	as	conclusive	evidence	to	justify	partial	relaxations	of	the
economy.	Again,	such	consensus	is	unlikely	to	exist	among	politicians	(and,	indeed,	scientists).
A	completely	different	but	equally	‘principled’	approach	is	the	one	that	relies	on	so-called	societal	resilience.	This
approach	advocates	a	quick	relaxation	of	measures,	investing	trust	in	citizens	and	business	owners	to	‘be	smart’
and	‘do	the	right	thing’.	It	can	work	if	the	cost	of	non-compliance	is	largely	falling	on	the	non-complier	(refusing	to
wear	a	seat-belt	will	mostly	come	at	the	expense	of	the	deviant	driver).	In	a	pandemic,	the	non-compliers	do	not	just
run	the	heightened	risk	of	being	infected,	but	also	increase	the	risk	of	transmission	to	others	(potentially
exponentially).	Most	policymakers	abhor	the	loss	of	control	that	this	approach	entails.	They	can	only	wait	and	see
what	happens,	but	they	will	be	held	accountable	for	any	failure	that	may	occur.	And	the	risks	of	a	resilience-based
approach	are	indeed	high:	the	models	suggest	it	may	well	lead	to	a	catastrophe.
Time	will	tell	which	approach	performs	better.	In	the	absence	of	real	knowledge	or	working	vaccines,	decision-
makers	will	remain	stuck	in	a	difficult	place:	both	approaches	offer	temptations	but	also	huge	risks.	This	makes	the
‘great	easing’	even	more	difficult	than	the	initial	declaration	of	emergency	measures.
The	way	forward	may	well	require	a	mixture	of	both	approaches.	The	pragmatic	approach	can	serve	as	the	default,
as	it	minimizes	risks	and	buys	time	to	learn	more,	even	if	the	political	and	administrative	costs	of	pursuing	such	a
strategy	are	likely	to	escalate.	For	some	economic	sectors,	the	risk	of	moving	too	slow	might	prove	fatal.	In	such
arenas,	a	reliance	on	resilience	may	be	worth	contemplating,	although	whether	customers	will	flock	back	to	these
sectors	in	sufficient	numbers	remains	to	be	seen.	In	some	other	areas,	we	may	simply	not	want	to	take	any	risks
(we	must	protect	those	who	cannot	protect	themselves).	Here	the	precautionary	principle	should	perhaps	govern
decisions.
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Whatever	the	choices	to	be	made,	it	is	clear	who	should	make	them.	Politicians	should	not	hide	behind	the	backs	of
experts.	They	must	do	what	they	were	elected	to	do,	even	if	this	might	require	humility,	continued	re-evaluation	and
justification	rather	than	sloganeering.	Crisis	management	is	a	key	part	of	their	task.	It	is	probably	the	hardest	task
they	will	ever	face.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	COVID-19	blog,	nor	LSE.	Image:	President	Trump
Delivers	Remarks	During	a	Coronavirus	Update	Briefing.
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